In an open-economy model with …nancial constraint, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) propose an expression for a capital control policy. From this expression, they argue that the optimal tax, i.e. the one that solves the overborrowing problem, is indeterminate when crises occur (i.e. when the constraint binds) and positive during normal times. In contrast, we show that their capital tax (i) is indeterminate during normal times and, in standard cases, positive during crises, and (ii) does not solve the overborrowing problem, and therefore it is not an optimal capital control policy, as opposed to the capital tax proposed by previous literature (positive during normal times and nil during crisis). We also show that the overborrowing problem can be solved as well by a subsidy on consumption (i) we focus on the ability of some crisis interventions to solve the overborrowing problem rather than their cyclicality, (ii) for ease of comparison we use very similar notation to that in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017), and (iii) Proof of Proposition 2 has changed.
Introduction
In a recent strand of literature, …nancial crises have been analyzed by means of open (endowment) economy models in which there is a negative feedback between the presence of an occasionally binding credit constraint and the underestimation of the social cost of debt. This literature gives a welfare foundation to the role of government interventions which intend to prevent and respond to those crises.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) (SGU hereafter) derive an expression for a capital control policy in the abovementioned class of models. From that expression they argue that the Ramsey-optimal tax is indeterminate when crises occur (i.e. when the credit constraint binds) and positive during normal times. In contrast, in the present paper we show that the expression obtained by SGU actually implies a tax that is indeterminate in normal times and, in standard cases, positive during crises. Furthermore, we show that such tax is not optimal as it does not solve the externality problem that results from the underestimation of the social costs of decentralized debt decisions.
The interaction of the credit constraint and the underestimation of the cost of debt has been shown to lead to overborrowing (see, for instance, Bianchi, 2011 and Jeanne and Korinek, 2011), measured as the di¤erence between the level of debt chosen by a social planner (SP) and the one chosen by households in a decentralized economy. Overborrowing is a consequence of the undervaluation of liquidity by private agents during crises. The capital tax proposed by the related literature (positive during normal times and nil during crisis) equalizes the level of decentralized debt (and consumption) to that of the SP during normal times. This is su¢ cient to implement the SP allocation during crises as well because the level of decentralized debt chosen is equal to that of the SP in those periods since both are equally constrained, given a state of the economy (i.e. the level of past debt and endowments). 1 In contrast, the expression found by SGU turns out to be indeterminate during normal times and positive but ine¤ective (given the state of the economy, it a¤ects neither the valuation of liquidity nor the allocation) during crises.
In addition, we demonstrate that a subsidy on consumption (positive during crises and zero in normal times) is also a solution to the overborrowing problem because it increases the valuation of liquidity during crises, and therefore implements the SP equilibrium. 2 1 This tax can be considered an indirect solution since it does not directly solve the problem of undervaluation during crises. Instead, it equalizes the allocation during normal times. In contrast the subsidy on consumption that we describe below directly solves the problem, as it equalizes the valuations of liquidity during crises.
2 Throughout the present paper, the …scal-policy framework corresponds to a balanced-budget setup: following the standard practice in the related literature, we assume that the speci…c intervention (tax or subsidy) is …nanced by means of a lump-sum transfer within the period. In Parra-Polania and Vargas (2016) we analyze countercyclical …scal-policy frameworks.
The Model and Results
Our theoretical framework is the same as that used by SGU and the related literature.
We model a small open endowment economy with consumers'preferences of the form
where E t denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available in period t, is the discount factor, U ( ) is the well-behaved period utility function, and c t denotes the consumption index which aggregates tradable (T ) and nontradable (N ) goods.
Every period, each household receives an exogenous bundle of tradable and nontradable goods, y T t and y N t , and has access to international …nancial markets through one-period loans d t+1 (d t+1 < 0 implies savings) at an exogenously given interest rate r t . The household's budget constraint is given by
where p t is the price of nontradables and the price of tradables has been normalized to one. We use a standard …nancial constraint in which there is access to credit up to a fraction > 0 of current total income:
The market-clearing conditions for nontradables and tradables, respectively, are:
Let t t be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint and t t t the one associated to the credit constraint. Given r t , d t , y T t , y N t and c N t = y N t , the solutions for c T t , t , t , d t+1 and p t can be obtained from: 3
If in period t the economy is unconstrained, d t+1 < y T t + p t y N t and hence from Equation (10) t = 0. If, instead, the economy is constrained, t 0 and d t+1 = y T t + p t y N t . Since private agents have an insigni…cant impact on the market, they take prices as given. Instead, a benevolent Social Planner (SP), subject to the same …nancial constraint, internalizes the e¤ect of borrowing decisions on prices. By following the constrainede¢ ciency criterion 4 , we assume that the SP is constrained by the same pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium. The SP acknowledges the e¤ects that consumption decisions have on price determination given by Equation (9).
and c N t = y N t , the …rst order conditions for the SP problem are: 5
where
Macroprudential tax
We replicate in this subsection some important elements from the related literature (e.g.
Bianchi, 2011; Jeanne and Korinek, 2011) which has shown that the SP allocation (i.e.
consumption and debt) can be implemented in a decentralized economy using a macroprudential tax on debt (triggered during normal times only).
In the next subsection we analyze the tax derived by SGU.
Suppose that in the decentralized economy the government imposes a tax t on debt during normal times (i.e. when the economy is constrained, t = 0), which is returned to the household in the same period through a lump-sum transfer l t . The budget constraint
There is a balanced-budget …scal policy every period:
Notice that with the incorporation of the tax, the system formed by Equations (6)- (10) remains the same except for Equation (7) which turns into
Proposition 1 In the economy described by Equations (1), (3), (15) and (16) there is a value of t such that the SP allocation (FOC: Equations (11)- (14)) is implemented in the decentralized economy, in any period t.
Proof. When the economy is …nancially constrained ( t 0, t = 0), we solve for c (11) and (6):
and hence the SP valuation of liquidity under crisis is greater, SP t t . In unconstrained periods ( t = 0), if there were no tax, although Equations (11)- (14) for the SP are of the same form as those for the decentralized economy, (6)-(8), they would not result in the same equilibrium, due to the di¤erence in the valuation of liquidity during crisis, speci…cally E t SP t+1 6 = E t t+1 . To implement the SP allocation in the decentralized economy, we introduce a tax t on debt such that (from (6) and (17), with t = 0):
becomes equal to (from (11) and (12), with SP t = 0) 6
Dividing (19) by (20) and taking into account that c SP t = c t and SP t+1 = t+1 (since the tax equalizes the allocations), the optimal tax can be expressed as follows: 6 Notice from (11) that
which is lower than one and positive.
Summarizing, the macroprudential tax policy that implements the SP allocation in the decentralized economy is such that t = 0 when the economy is …nancially constrained, and follows (21) in normal times.
SGU tax
SGU derive their tax directly from Equation (19) (Equations (19) and (20) in their paper)
and by imposing t = 0 for all t. In this way, we obtain the following expression for the SGU tax:
which is equal to their equation (26).
Proposition 2 A tax on debt described by Equation (22) (i.e. the SGU tax) does not implement the SP allocation in the decentralized economy.
Proof. (i) When the economy is not …nancially constrained, the SGU tax makes the system indeterminate:
Since t = 0, without a tax, the solutions for c TSGU argue that their tax is indeterminate during crises because they assume that only one equation (Equation (17)) is the relevant one for the determination of both t and t ;
however, as explained in the proof of Proposition 2, these two variables are determined by two independent equations: (17) and (22).
The SGU tax fails to implement the SP allocation in the decentralized economy because it satis…es just condition (19) and disregards condition (20). During crises, the SGU tax is, for pretty standard cases, positive: for the case of the explicit functions and parameter values considered by SGU and the related literature, U 0 (c t ) @c t =@c T t is decreasing in the levels of consumption and hence when the expected level of future consumption is higher than the current one -as usual during crises-the SGU tax, from (22), is positive. 8 SGU conduct some numerical simulations that seem to con…rm their theoretical conclusions about the optimal tax being indeterminate during crises and positive during normal times. It is worth explaining why this occurs. For periods where the constraint binds (i.e crises), they set t to "Not a number" (NaN) by construction (and according to their theoretical result). Regarding periods where the economy is not constrained, SGU are able to determine t because they numerically solve the problem for the SP and then they use those results to assign a value, from Equation (22).
As shown in Proposition 2, Equation (22) does not implement the SP allocation in the decentralized economy. However, it can be shown that Equation (21) is equivalent to
Since this, the appropriate tax, equalizes the allocations of the decentralized and the SP cases (and hence c SP t = c t and c T;SP t = c T t ), its value and the ex-post value assigned to the SGU tax (i.e. based on the SP solutions) shall be equal. 9 
Ex-post subsidy on consumption
In this subsection we show that the SP equilibrium can be implemented in a decentralized economy by means of an alternative policy: a subsidy on consumption that applies in crisis periods only (i.e. an ex-post subsidy). 8 Assuming a CES function for the consumption index aggregator -with intratemporal elasticity of substitution and weight a on tradables-and a CRRA function for utility -with intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1= -we have that U 0 (ct) @ct=@c
1= . It is usually assumed that 1= < , which is a su¢ cient condition for U 0 (ct) @ct=@c T t to be decreasing in the levels of consumption. 9 This preserves the most important numerical result of the paper by SGU which is showing that for standard functions and parameter values the optimal capital tax is procyclical during normal times (leaving crises aside). Of course this is not true for the SGU tax since, as we have shown, it is indeterminate during normal times, but it is true for the optimal tax (Equation (21)): for standard functions and parameter values the optimal tax is higher when the probability of being …nancially constrained in the next period increases. With output persistence, such event is more likely during a low-income period than during a high-income one, and hence the optimal tax should be higher during the former and lower during the latter. This procyclical relation is only broken during crises when the optimal tax is the lowest (zero).
Suppose the government, in the decentralized economy, imposes a subsidy ! t > 0 on both tradable and nontradable consumption which is triggered in crisis periods only (! t = 0 in normal times) and it is …nanced through a lump-sum tax l t . The budget constraint is
There is a balanced-budget …scal policy every period such that
Proposition 3 In the economy described by Equations (1), (3), (24) and (25) there is a value of ! t , such that the SP allocation is implemented in the decentralized economy, in any period t.
Proof. As explained in the proof of Proposition 1, in unconstrained periods the decentralized equation system is of the same form as that of the SP. Also explained in that proof, during crises both allocations coincide (c
, for a given state r t , d t , y T t , y N t ) but the SP valuation of liquidity is greater, SP t t . The subsidy on consumption can then be used to equalize them. In this case, the …rst order conditions with respect to c T t and c N t , respectively, are:
which implies that Equation (9) remains the same. Since Equations (7) and (12) are of the same form, then it will be enough to equalize (26) to (11), which implies that the optimal subsidy is
where we have taken into account that c SP t = c t , SP t = t and SP t = t , because ! t is equalizing the equilibria. Multiplying and dividing by t the subsidy can be expressed as
which is positive and less than one.
It is important to point out that, unlike the macroprudential tax, the ex-post subsidy (28) is no longer a solution if we remove the assumption that lenders overlook the e¤ect of lump-sum taxes on borrowing capacity. As mentioned by Parra-Polania and Vargas (2015, pp. 5-6), the standard …nancial constraint (3) implicitly assumes that international lenders su¤er from a sort of …scal illusion since they do not take into account that at the moment of debt repayment households have to pay taxes, which reduces their income available for debt repayments. In that paper, we remove this assumption and propose the following …nancial constraint:
It is easy to see that, under this alternative constraint, the ex-post subsidy on consumption (28) is not able to implement the SP equilibrium because the lump-sum tax that …nances the subsidy a¤ects borrowing capacity. As a result, the equation system that solves for Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) derive an expression for a capital control policy in the abovementioned class of models. From that expression they argue that the Ramseyoptimal tax is indeterminate when crises occur (i.e. when the credit constraint binds) and positive during normal times. In contrast, we show that their capital tax (i) is indeterminate during normal times and, in standard cases, positive during crises, and (ii) does not solve the overborrowing problem, and therefore it is not an optimal capital control policy, as opposed to the capital tax proposed by previous literature (positive during normal times and nil during crisis).
We show that the overborrowing problem can be solved as well by an ex-post subsidy on consumption (positive during crises and zero during normal times). We also point out that, unlike the macroprudential tax, this ex-post subsidy is no longer a solution if we remove the assumption that lenders overlook the e¤ect of lump-sum taxes on borrowing capacity.
